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Punishment regulates selfish behaviors and maintains cooperation. However, because punishment imposes costs on another person, it could also harm relationships. The current work asked how punishment shapes 5- to 10-year-olds' (Study 1; n=128) and adults' (Study 2; n=159) attitudes toward punishers and those who receive punishment as well as their inferences about relationships between punishers and targets. We reasoned that the motives underlying punishment might shape evaluations; punishments motivated by prosocial desires may elicit more positive responses than punishments motivated by antisocial desires. We tested both motives that were external to the punisher (the behavior that elicited the punishment) as well as internal motives (the desire to harm versus rehabilitate transgressors). The main result is that we found negative social relationships among punishers, targets, and observers. Both children and adults preferred punishers who inflicted punishment for behaviors that violated (versus did not violate) norms, preferred targets of punishment who had not (versus had) violated norms, and expected punishers and targets to dislike each other. External motives, but not internal motives, consistently influenced participants’ own social preferences. In contrast, neither external nor internal motives consistently shaped participants' inferences about social relationships between punishers and their targets. Our work contributes to social cognitive development by clarifying how motives shape children's and adults' understanding of social relationships. 

Punishment is a key mechanism to regulate selfish behaviors and maintain cooperation in a society. However, children often show mixed evaluations about third-party punishment. The current work asked how punishment severity might shape children's social judgments. In two studies, 5- to 10-year-old children heard about a punisher who took different numbers of items from a transgressor and evaluated the punisher's behavior and moral character. In Study 1 (n=68), when the transgression was relatively mild (i.e., unfair sharing), children across ages evaluated taking no items from the unfair sharer ("no punishment") most positively, while evaluating taking three items ("harshest punishment") most negatively. In Study 2 (n=68), when the transgression was more serious (i.e., stealing), younger children evaluated taking two items ("equality-establishing punishment") more positively than older children, while evaluating taking none most negatively. However, children became more likely to evaluate equality-establishing punishment negatively with age. Overall, the current results show that punishment severity is a key factor underlying children's third-party punishment judgments. The current research extends work on moral development by showing how children conceptualize the severity of punishment. 

Humans behave more prosocially toward ingroup (vs. outgroup) members. This preregistered research examined the influence of God concepts and memories of past behavior on prosociality toward outgroups. In Study 1 (n = 573), participants recalled their past kind or mean behavior (between-subjects) directed toward an outgroup. Subsequently, they completed a questionnaire assessing their views of God. Our dependent measure was the number of lottery entries given to another outgroup member. Participants who recalled their kind (vs. mean) behavior perceived God as more benevolent, which in turn predicted more generous allocation to the outgroup (vs. ingroup). Study 2 (n = 281) examined the causal relation by manipulating God concepts (benevolent vs. punitive). We found that not only recalling kind behaviors but perceiving God as benevolent increased outgroup generosity. The current research extends work on morality, religion, and intergroup relations by showing that benevolent God concepts and memories of past kind behaviors jointly increase outgroup generosity. 

Laypeople often believe that God punishes transgressions; however, their inferences about God’s punishment motives remain unclear. We addressed this topic by asking laypeople to indicate why God punishes. We also examined participants’ inferences about why humans punish to contribute to scholarly conversations regarding the extent to which people may anthropomorphize God’s mind. In Studies 1A to 1C, participants viewed God as less retributive than humans. In Study 2, participants expected God (vs. humans) to view humans’ true selves more positively; this difference mediated participants’ views of God as less retributive than humans. Study 3 manipulated agents’ views of humans’ true selves and examined how such information influenced each agent’s perceived motives. Participants viewed a given agent as less retributive when that agent regarded the true self as good (versus bad). These findings extend scholarship on lay theories of punishment motives and highlight links between religious and moral cognition.